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A variety of factors led or contributed to the current ﬁ  nancial crisis, including  loose monetary policy; 
excessive ﬁ  nancial market liquidity, leverage and maturity mismatch; weak risk management and underwriting 
standards; and poor incentives and regulatory gaps in some important segments of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
These weaknesses were ampliﬁ  ed by certain procyclical dynamics in regulatory, accounting and risk 
management frameworks. The banking sector was at the centre of the crisis as the market stress led to 
an acute re-concentration of on- and off-balance sheet risks in banks, putting pressure on capital buffers, 
liquidity and credit availability. The weaknesses in the banking sector ampliﬁ  ed the transmission of shocks 
from the ﬁ  nancial sector to the real economy. 
Strengthening the banking sector and how it is managed and regulated is critical to a return to both near- 
and long-term ﬁ  nancial stability. The Basel Committee’s programme to promote a more robust supervisory 
and regulatory framework for the banking sector has ﬁ  ve key components: strengthening the regulatory 
capital framework; increasing banks’ liquidity buffers; enhancing bank governance, risk management 
and supervision; improving market transparency; and deepening cross-border supervisory cooperation 
for internationally active banks. Taken together, and reinforced through a macroprudential approach to 
regulation and supervision, these efforts will promote a banking sector that is more resilient to future 
periods of economic and ﬁ  nancial stress and help reduce systemic risk. 
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S
upervisors and central banks have taken swift 
and unprecedented actions to mitigate the 
effects of the ﬁ  nancial crisis that began in 
mid 2007. The scale and signiﬁ  cance of the measures 
taken demonstrate the special place banks and other 
systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions have in 
the modern economy and reemphasise the need for 
effective regulation and supervision of this crucially 
important sector in the global economy. The ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has exposed many examples where bankers 
have strayed from the basic principles of sound risk 
management and underwriting practices and where 
supervisors did not sufﬁ  ciently probe and follow-up 
on these weaknesses. While other factors contributed 
to the crisis beyond weaknesses in risk management, 
regulation, and supervision, to one degree or another, 
bankers, policy makers and supervisors must confront 
the fact that they did not prevent the eruption of this 
crisis or constrain its virulence. 
As a result of the crisis, banks and other ﬁ  nancial 
market participants have sharply (and perhaps 
rationally when viewed on an individual basis) 
deleveraged their balance sheets. The result of this 
deleveraging process has been a contraction in lending 
and hence, a large decline in the real economy, with 
second round effects impacting other credit portfolios, 
such as retail and commercial real estate loans. The 
speed and scale of these developments have been 
nothing short of astonishing and the response by 
the ofﬁ  cial sector also has been unprecedented and 
covered a wide range of measures. The ofﬁ  cial sector, 
including supervisory authorities, continues to work 
nationally as well as across borders to keep the crisis 
from worsening and to encourage the resumption 
of lending activities to support the real economy. 
In addition, supervisors are working to develop a 
coordinated strategy to put the banking system on 
a sound footing over the longer term. Such efforts 
will further reinforce near term conﬁ  dence-building 
measures and provide a long term target around 
which national and global policy making efforts 
can converge.
1| THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
WHAT WENT WRONG?
As has been the case with past ﬁ  nancial downturns, the 
violation of fundamental risk management principles 
is a key cause of today’s problems. While there were a 
number of causes that contributed to the crisis, it was 
the combination of several factors that helped form 
the perfect storm which culminated in the severity of 
the crisis we are now facing. For example, excessively 
loose monetary policy led to the availability of easy 
credit, and a large amount of pre-crisis, system-wide 
liquidity. This, together with a booming global 
economy and exuberant capital markets, contributed 
to excessive risk taking and an aggressive “search 
for yield”. Moreover, poor incentives arising from 
the originate-to-distribute  (OTD) model helped 
fuel unsustainable leverage within and outside the 
banking sector, compounding the effect of already 
high levels of consumer debt. Some of this mortgage 
debt was poorly underwritten and, in some cases, 
originated by ﬁ  rms that were un- or under-regulated, 
thus revealing regulatory gaps in some important 
segments of the ﬁ  nancial system. At the same time, 
there were fundamental shortcomings in ﬁ  nancial 
institutions’ governance, of which the current risk 
management shortcomings are just a symptom. 
The rapid growth of fair value accounting further 
compounded an already fragile situation. In the 
run-up to the crisis, many banks did not employ 
robust fair valuation techniques. This included, 
for example, failing to capture the uncertainty 
around liquidity estimates, model assumptions and 
counterparty credit risks. Many valuation techniques 
also relied too heavily on rating agency estimates. 
As liquidity in ﬁ  nancial markets evaporated, credit 
spreads on structured products increased due to the 
higher liquidity risk premia. The wider credit spreads 
led to lower mark-to-market valuations, which in 
turn resulted in lower earnings and accumulated 
unrealised losses, and ultimately, an erosion in 
banks’ capital. In response, banks sold assets to 
offset their growing leverage and liquidity needs but 
such “ﬁ  re sales” of these instruments led to further 
mark-to-market losses. 
Loan loss provisioning practices were less than 
adequate and also exacerbated the crisis. In particular, 
accounting standards that are based on the “incurred 
loss model” do not provide adequate scope for 
banks to exercise necessary judgement and to take 
a sufﬁ  ciently longer term view of the inherent loss 
in a loan over its lifetime.
Finally, supervisory measures to identify and 
contain some of these damaging developments 
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were inadequate. While supervisors historically 
tend to focus on bank-speciﬁ  c issues, the crisis has 
illustrated that greater attention must also be paid to 
the broader aspects of ﬁ  nancial stability. For example, 
excessive leverage, risk concentrations and maturity 
mismatches —whether on- or off-balance sheet— can 
in combination have severe consequences for entire 
sectors, the broader ﬁ  nancial system and the global 
economy. One of the main lessons from this turmoil 
is that both bankers and supervisors need to remain 
focused on the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole, as well 
as the longer term horizon. 
1|1 Liquidity
Available liquidity, due to its abundance prior to the 
crisis, was often treated as a free good by banks. This was 
particularly damaging for banks as they developed and 
invested in complex structured products, with little or 
no consideration of the potential for these products to 
become illiquid. Off-balance sheet exposures were often 
not considered as potential liquidity draws on the ﬁ  rm, 
especially products with a recent or limited history of not 
requiring liquidity. For instance, since there had been 
extensive liquidity in the system for several years, many 
contingent commitments had been issued, but not drawn 
upon. This illustrates the hazards of risk management 
relying on a data series that does not incorporate a 
period of stress. As both asset and funding markets 
had been liquid for an extended period, banks did not 
consider stress scenarios that involved key asset and 
funding markets drying up. Banks also usually did not 
consider the interaction of credit, market and liquidity 
risks and rarely considered a sustained period of liquidity 
stress. In combination, these factors left the banking 
sector with inadequate liquidity cushions to absorb the 
current period of stress and ultimately required massive 
injections of liquidity by central banks. 
During the initial phase of the current crisis, the 
lack of asset and funding liquidity was particularly 
acute. Liquidity in certain asset and funding markets 
completely disappeared, even for normally “reliable” 
markets such as the interbank market, for a much 
longer period than the vast majority of market 
participants had envisioned. The lesson drawn from 
this experience is that banks’ resilience to system 
wide liquidity shocks —affecting both market and 
funding liquidity— should be signiﬁ  cantly increased 
and their management of this risk strengthened. 
This is also an area which requires much greater 
supervisory attention going forward. 
The recent market turbulence has shown that banks 
must strengthen their liquidity buffers. One way for 
banks to accomplish this is to increase their holdings 
of high quality liquid securities, in particular, liquid 
government securities. The size of these cushions 
should be dimensioned according to banks’ stress tests 
and contingency planning exercises. In addition, while 
liquidity risk cannot be entirely mitigated with capital, 
capital can help improve the liquidity proﬁ  le of a ﬁ  rm 
since, unlike other liabilities, much of regulatory capital 
does not have to be repaid. Furthermore, a strong capital 
buffer enhances a bank’s creditworthiness and, from 
the market’s perspective, reduces its counterparty risk 
and helps to ensure continued access to funding. 
1|2 Capital  adequacy 
It is now clear that the level of risk was grossly 
underestimated by many financial institutions 
during several years of high, often record, proﬁ  ts. 
The crisis also has emphasised the importance of 
not only the level of banks’ capital but the quality 
as well. Over the last year and a half, high losses 
have put pressure on banks’ capital cushions and 
impaired their ability to lend. Many banks have 
been forced to replenish their capital base. A strong, 
capital buffer is necessary to absorb unexpected 
losses and Basel II was designed so that more risk-
intensive activities required higher capital cushions. 
In addition to strengthening the risk coverage of the 
Basel II framework, the Committee is working to 
increase the quality and global consistency of the 
capital base backing banks’ risk exposures. 
1|3 The  originate-to-distribute  model
An important driver behind the build up of leverage in 
the ﬁ  nancial system was the shift by many global banks to 
an OTD business model, which these banks increasingly 
employed to transfer various risks, including subprime, 
to the market. To this end, banks repackaged loans that 
they had originated into securitisations —often legally 
set apart in the form of special purpose vehicles— and 
distributed or sold them to investors instead of keeping 
them on their balance sheet. 
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A signiﬁ  cant problem associated with the OTD model 
was one of incentives. Instead of the traditional 
focus on a borrower’s ability to repay a loan, many 
banks focused instead on generating a high volume 
of loans, and booking as income the fees received for 
originating the mortgage loans. Many ﬁ  rms chose not 
to invest the necessary time and resources to perform 
thorough credit analysis and underwriting since 
another party would be purchasing the mortgage. 
Unfortunately, many banks that also retained 
signiﬁ  cant interests in a securitisation (e.g., in the 
most senior tranches) also failed to manage their 
exposures appropriately. 
Investors also did not perform adequate due diligence, 
particularly when a structured security was highly 
rated. Instead, investors relied on the due diligence of 
originators and packagers, who lacked the incentives 
to perform this function adequately. In addition, 
investors placed undue reliance on the judgments 
of the credit rating agencies, the capacity of modern 
ﬁ  nancial modelling, and diversiﬁ  cation to manage 
ﬁ  nancial risks. The ratings attached to structured 
products further catalysed the OTD process as too 
many investors blindly trusted them without assessing 
the underlying assets. 
Some tranches that were labelled AAA by the rating 
agencies carried spreads of 200 basis points above 
the risk-free rate, indicating that some investors 
were aware that not all AAA-ratings were equal, but 
many investors did not consider the risks beyond 
those captured by the ratings. On one hand, ratings 
did not serve as reliable measures to convey the 
riskiness of mortgage-backed portfolios, whereas on 
the other, many investors were insufﬁ  ciently aware 
of the exact nature of the ratings, which do not cover 
other risks such as volatility, liquidity, market and 
correlation risk.
Although securitisation has its merits and can 
contribute to the ﬁ  nancial system’s liquidity and 
efﬁ  ciency, the crisis has clearly shown that the 
OTD model needs to be implemented much more 
carefully. A fundamental premise of the OTD model 
is easy, accessible liquidity. The extreme difﬁ  culties 
and ruinous results stemming from the absence of 
well-functioning and liquid capital markets were laid 
bare by the crisis.
1|4 Unsustainable  leverage
Many parties in the ﬁ  nancial system, particularly 
banks and securities ﬁ  rms, took on excessive levels 
of risk. Leverage was both on- and off-balance 
sheet, explicit and embedded in complex products. 
Essentially, by applying a myriad of leverage 
strategies that were aimed at meeting the market’s 
proﬁ  tability demands, the banks made themselves 
highly vulnerable to economic and ﬁ  nancial shocks. 
Eventually, deterioration in the US subprime 
mortgage sector, which constitutes a relatively small 
part of the global ﬁ  nancial market, was the catalyst 
for the ﬁ  nancial crisis. Uncertainty about losses on 
mortgage-backed securities and other related assets 
and, hence, about their valuation, coupled with a 
generalised heightened risk aversion, resulted in large 
write-offs. This, in turn, resulted in a rapid erosion 
of banks’ existing capital buffers. 
Further leverage and term-structure mismatch 
risk arose where mortgage-backed securities were 
ﬁ  nanced with short term commercial paper that 
was sold with credit enhancements and liquidity 
support. As a consequence of this disregard of the 
risks inherent in structured products and funding 
vehicles, the systemic scale of the subprime bubble 
was severely underestimated, as was the degree of 
risk concentration throughout the system. While 
exposing themselves to subprime tranches, banks 
effectively took on greater leverage via off-balance 
sheet vehicles in ways that generally were not 
reﬂ  ected in the Basel I and ordinary leverage ratios. 
When losses emerged that quickly wiped out the 
junior and often the mezzanine tranches as well, some 
banks realised that they needed to provide support 
to investors for reputational reasons. Risks which 
banks had considered as transferred to other market 
participants actually came back to the banks and 
the capital and liquidity buffers of some banks were 
signiﬁ  cantly impaired as a result. These banks’ capital 
buffers were further impaired by losses in the value 
of tranches that the banks themselves held. 
The affected banks and securities ﬁ  rms had to quickly 
reduce their leverage. The market demanded much 
higher simple tangible equity-to-asset leverage ratios, 
and many had taken their eye off the ball of this type 
of basic metric. As a result, banks had to reduce their 
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lending, which has had negative consequences for the 
real economy. As asset values declined due to lack 
of demand and uncertainty about their true value, 
complex ﬁ  nancial products and ﬁ  nancial institutions 
not involved in subprime lending were also adversely 
affected due to the overall uncertainty and lack of 
conﬁ  dence in the market. This expanded the impact 
of the crisis by damaging funding possibilities and 
asset sale prices on a system wide scale. 
1|5 Risk  management 
and governance 
As I noted earlier, many banks failed to practice 
some of the fundamental aspects of risk management 
and governance. While risk-taking and leverage are 
essential elements in banking, the manner in which 
these elements were managed and controlled was 
inadequate. In addition, complacency on the part 
of bankers and supervisors certainly played a role. 
The banking industry was exceedingly optimistic 
during times of benign economic conditions. In such 
instances, it can be difﬁ  cult to maintain a proper 
perspective and to exercise prudent judgment when 
your competitors are generating high volumes of 
business. An obsessive drive to generate high 
short-term proﬁ  ts also contributed to the crisis. 
This myopic outlook led to generous bonus payments 
to employees without proper regard to the longer-term 
risks they imposed on their ﬁ  rms. These perverse 
incentives ampliﬁ  ed the excessive risk-taking that 
severely threatened the global ﬁ  nancial system and 
left ﬁ  rms with fewer resources to absorb losses as 
risks materialised.
Financial crises are repeatedly characterised by 
the failure to adhere to basic risk management 
principles, especially during times of benign 
economic conditions and rapid ﬁ  nancial innovation. 
In hindsight, supervisors did not always take the 
difﬁ  cult decisions to correct these failures by, for 
example, dampening lending to non-creditworthy 
borrowers or constraining leverage. 
At the core of it all is poor underwriting standards. 
This point can not be emphasised enough. Everything 
else down the securitisation chain is affected by this 
initial shortcoming. This crisis is no different from 
others in that weakness in many banks’ fundamental 
underwriting principles was, among other factors, a 
key contributor to the asset quality problems that 
have arisen. In addition, poor risk management at 
a number of ﬁ  rms resulted in a massive build-up of 
risk concentrations within and across institutions 
that further compounded already weak asset quality. 
These banks were caught unaware by concentrations 
to subprime loans that they had in their traditional 
loan portfolios, in trading books, in off-balance sheet 
vehicles, and with counterparties. Many did not 
understand their full exposure to subprime mortgages, 
particularly when they purchased structured credit 
products, eg collateralised debt obligations backed 
by residential subprime mortgage-backed securities 
(i.e. so-called “resecuritisations”). Poor asset quality 
and excessive risk concentrations are the core 
of the subprime mortgage problems. Banks and 
supervisors must intensify efforts to ensure that 
sound underwriting standards are in place and 
adhered to, and that there are adequate, systematic 
procedures for identifying ﬁ  rm- and system-wide 
risk concentrations. 
2| THE BASEL COMMITTEE’S 
STRATEGIC RESPONSE
The ﬁ  nancial crisis is without precedent in this 
generation and likewise so has been the ofﬁ  cial 
sector response. In formulating responses to the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, it is necessary to address both the 
near term challenges related to the weakening 
economic and ﬁ  nancial situation and the long term 
regulatory structure issues. The two are linked and 
it is important to manage carefully the transition 
from current measures to a more sustainable long 
term framework.
It is critical that supervisors have a comprehensive 
strategy to deal with both phases of the crisis and their 
associated impact on banks. That is essential if we 
are to restore stability to our ﬁ  nancial systems and 
economies. When it comes to the long term, there 
is a need to establish a clear target for the future 
regulatory system which substantially reduces both 
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the probability and severity of a crisis like the one 
we currently are working though. Providing clarity 
about the future regulatory framework will help to 
re-establish near term conﬁ  dence, reduce the risk 
of competitive distortions and limit the degrees of 
uncertainty for the public and private sector. Also, by 
emphasising that these reforms will be phased in 
over an appropriate horizon, we reduce the risk 
that our own actions contribute to procyclicality 
in the system.
The Basel Committee has and will be undertaking 
a number of steps to produce a more robust 
supervisory and regulatory framework for the banking 
sector. Such a framework needs to have ﬁ  ve key 
components: 
￿  strong regulatory capital,
￿ robust standards for bank liquidity management 
and supervision,
￿  enhanced risk management and supervision,
￿ better  transparency,
￿  cross-border supervisory cooperation.
2|1 Regulatory  capital
The Basel Committee has underscored the importance 
of a strong capital base as a necessary condition 
for a strong banking sector. The level of capital in 
the banking system needs to be strengthened to 
raise its resilience to future episodes of economic 
and ﬁ  nancial stress. The Committee will do this 
through a combination of initiatives. The objective 
will be to arrive at a total level and quality of capital 
that is higher than the current Basel I and Basel II 
frameworks and appropriate to promote the stability 
of the banking sector over the long run. This effort 
will be phased in over a time frame that will not 
aggravate the current stress.
The three pillars of the Basel II framework were 
developed to provide a more resilient capital 
framework than Basel I with multiple safeguards 
built into it. In response to the crisis, in January 2009 
the Committee issued for public consultation a 
series of proposals to enhance each Pillar of Basel II 
and it is considering additional areas for potential 
future development.
RISK COVERAGE
First, the Committee strives to ensure that key risks 
are identiﬁ  ed, managed and captured in the capital 
framework. Financial innovation is a necessary 
and desirable element of any vibrant and growing 
ﬁ  nancial system but only if it is accompanied by 
commensurate advancement in risk management 
techniques and supervision. 
One of the most procyclical dynamics has been the 
failure of risk management and capital frameworks 
to capture key exposures in advance of the crisis. 
For example, the risks arising from securitisation 
activities —especially resecuritisations— as well as certain 
trading book exposures were not sufﬁ  ciently recognised, 
with inadequate capital held against these exposures. 
As I noted earlier, I could also point to exposures to 
complex ﬁ  nancial instruments that experienced severe 
declines in value because of impaired liquidity. The 
Basel Committee’s response therefore is to enhance the 
Basel II framework so that risks are more comprehensively 
and more accurately covered as they are taken on. 
The recently proposed enhancements to the Basel II 
framework include measures to increase capital for 
certain complex products, including resecuritisations. 
The crisis has shown that resecuritisations are more 
highly correlated with systematic risk than are traditional 
securitisations. Resecuritisations, therefore, warrant a 
higher capital charge. 
The Committee also proposes to require that banks 
obtain comprehensive information about the underlying 
exposure characteristics of their externally-rated 
securitisation positions, both within and across 
structures. Failure to conduct such due diligence 
would also result in higher capital requirements. 
In Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework 
and Guidelines for computing capital for incremental 
risk in the trading book, which the Committee also 
published for public consultation in January 2009, the 
Committee set out guidance to increase the capital 
backing exposures held in the trading book, where 
many banks have experienced the majority of losses 
to date. Our goal is to help ensure that the amount 
of capital held at banks will reﬂ  ect (and prudently 
constrain) risks which the banks are taking. 
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QUALITY OF CAPITAL
In addition, the composition of this capital buffer is 
important both for the utilisation of the buffer in times 
of stress, as well as in maintaining market conﬁ  dence. 
One way to help achieve this is by strengthening 
the quality, consistency and transparency of the 
highest forms of Tier 1 capital. A clear deﬁ  nition of 
capital needs to be transparent and must be global to 
ensure competitive equality. The Basel Committee 
already has a strong foundation for such a deﬁ  nition, 
namely common equity and reserves. We are now 
taking steps to address the many differences related 
to deﬁ  nitional issues, such as deductions from capital 
and the treatment of prudential ﬁ  lters. This will help 
to harmonise a deﬁ  nition of capital across jurisdictions 
so that there is more comparability and market trust 
regarding the quality of capital buffers from bank 
to bank.
PROCYCLICALITY
Third, we need to address procyclicality. Procyclicality 
is a complex issue and it is the product of many factors. 
At the most basic level, it is the result of animal spirits, 
which produce exuberant behaviour in the upswing of 
the cycle, and fear during the downturn. We cannot 
change this behaviour, but we can seek to dampen 
the channels through which it manifests itself. These 
include accounting and capital frameworks, liquidity 
regimes, risk management and compensation, 
margining, basic infrastructure, transparency, and 
the way supervision is carried out. In the case of 
the regulatory capital regime, we need to address 
any excess cyclicality in minimum requirements 
over the credit cycle while maintaining appropriate 
risk coverage and sensitivity. The Committee is also 
working to promote strong provisioning practices 
over the credit cycle. In addition, the Committee 
has put in place a process to systematically assess 
the quantitative impact of Basel II on the level and 
cyclicality of capital, and will take appropriate steps 
if the results of the capital monitoring suggest the 
capital framework is unduly procyclical.
But even more importantly, we need to build 
countercyclical buffers into capital frameworks and 
provisioning practices. This will help ensure that 
reserves and capital are built up during periods of 
earnings growth, so that they can be drawn down 
during periods of stress. The Committee is working 
to translate this important principle into a concrete 
proposal. The approach needs to have robust standards 
that can be applied at the global level and translated 
into national contexts.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES
Finally, the capital framework needs to be underpinned 
by a non-risk based supplementary measure. Just 
like we expect banks to manage to a variety of 
measures when they assess risk (such as net and 
gross exposures, VaR and stress tests), supervisors also 
must not be constrained by evaluating risk through 
the lens of a single, risk based measure. We need the 
risk based measure (i.e. Basel II capital requirements) 
to interact with a simple metric that can act as a ﬂ  oor 
and help contain the build up of excessive leverage 
in the banking system, one of the key sources of the 
current crisis. The Basel Committee is working to 
develop by the end of 2009 a speciﬁ  c proposal in this 
area. Key principles guiding this work are that the 
measure must be simple and transparent, and it must 
address issues related to accounting differences and 
off-balance sheet exposures, among others. Finally, 
it needs to interact with the risk based measure in a 
prudent but sensible manner. 
Once these different streams of work are further 
advanced, taken together they will form the basis for 
the Committee’s assessment of the appropriate level 
of minimum capital that should be put in place over 
the long term. But whatever we do —and this gets back 
to my link between the near and long term— we must 
not raise global capital requirements in the middle of 
this crisis. Capital buffers are there to be used and we 
must provide a clear road map where we are headed.
2|2 Liquidity  management 
and supervision
Capital is a necessary condition for banking system 
soundness but by itself is not sufﬁ  cient. Of equal 
importance is a strong liquidity base. Many banks 
that had adequate capital levels have still experienced 
difﬁ  culties during the crisis because they did not 
manage their liquidity in a prudent manner. As 
market and public conﬁ  dence in a bank is dependent 
on a bank’s ability to meet payment obligations in 
a timely manner without taking actions that would 
adversely affect the bank, a liquidity shortfall, real 
or perceived, at a bank can seriously undermine 
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market conﬁ  dence. This could potentially lead to 
a suspension of further transactions with the bank 
and its very rapid demise as it no longer has access 
to funding sources. 
In response to these shortcomings, the Basel 
Committee last September issued its Principles of 
sound liquidity risk management and supervision. 
These principles were designed to strengthen 
banks’ liquidity risk management. They focus on 
the governance, measurement, management and 
monitoring of liquidity risk. The guidance requires 
banks to incorporate the cost of liquidity in internal 
transfer pricing, capture liquidity risks posed by 
intraday transactions, appropriately manage collateral 
and measure potential increases in haircuts. It also 
sets standards for stress tests and mandates that 
banks develop stress tests which capture a broad 
range of both asset and funding liquidity risks and 
the interactions with other types of risks. Both a 
bank’s contingency funding plans and the size of its 
liquidity buffer must take account of the stress test 
results. Finally, the guidance requires that banks 
maintain strong liquidity buffers comprised of high 
quality liquid assets. 
The issuance of the principles was a signiﬁ  cant step 
toward setting a new global soundness standard for 
what constitutes robust liquidity risk measurement, 
management and supervision. But this was only the 
ﬁ  rst step. The next step is to monitor implementation 
of the principles and we have put in place a process to 
do just that. We also are developing benchmarks, tools 
and metrics that supervisors can use to promote more 
consistent liquidity standards for cross-border banks.
2|3 Better  risk  management 
and supervision 
Having stronger global standards for capital and 
liquidity is important, but this is not enough. If ﬁ  rms 
have poor governance and risk management cultures 
or if supervision lacks independence or is weak, 
then we could again ﬁ  nd ourselves with the types 
of problems we are now facing. 
The Committee has expanded Basel II’s supervisory 
review process —Pillar 2— to raise the bar for 
risk management and supervision practices. The 
Committee’s Basel  II enhancements published 
in January 2009 included supplemental Pillar 2 
guidance. The purpose of this guidance is to address 
the ﬂ  aws in risk management practices revealed by the 
crisis, which in many cases were symptoms of more 
fundamental shortcomings in governance structures 
at financial institutions. The guidance focuses 
on ﬁ  rm-wide governance and risk management; 
capturing the risk of off-balance sheet exposures and 
securitisation activities; more effectively managing 
risk concentrations; and providing incentives to better 
manage risk and returns over the long term, including 
compensation practices.
The supplemental Pillar 2 guidance also addresses 
valuation practices, which is more fully covered in a 
set of principles recently issued by the Committee, 
Supervisory guidance for assessing banks’ ﬁ  nancial 
instrument fair value practices. This guidance assists 
banks and banking supervisors in strengthening 
valuation processes for financial instruments. 
Among other things, the principles promote strong 
governance processes around valuations and strong 
supervisory oversight around bank valuation practices. 
The Committee has also initiated work to promote 
enhanced provisioning approaches. Such approaches to 
recognise and measure loan losses would incorporate 
a broader range of available credit information. 
The ﬁ  nancial crisis has highlighted the importance 
of prudent, well-informed standards and supervisory 
guidance. Critically, however, it has also underscored 
the need to effectively and consistently implement 
such standards. While Basel II implementation issues, 
supervisory colleges and home-host issues remain a 
high priority, the Committee will redouble its efforts 
to promote implementation of all Basel Committee 
standards in an internationally coordinated and 
consistent manner.
There is also a need to move towards a macroprudential 
approach to supervision. What does this mean? 
In our discussions in the Basel Committee, we 
have emphasised the need to focus supervision not 
just on the soundness of individual banks but on 
broader ﬁ  nancial stability objectives, to consider the 
systemic impact and implications of ﬁ  nancial sector 
developments, growth, and risks. This should inform 
where we focus our supervisory resources and how 
we design our supervisory and regulatory tools. 
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2|4 Transparency 
Conﬁ  dence among counterparties, investors, analysts 
and other market participants is a crucial element 
for the well-functioning of any ﬁ  nancial system. 
One of the main ampliﬁ  ers of the crisis was the 
lack of transparency regarding the risk proﬁ  le of 
institutions and structured products, which led to 
a massive reduction in investment in the ﬁ  nancial 
sector by investors and counterparties. This further 
exacerbated the deleveraging process. Moreover, the 
process by which structured products are valued often 
lacks rigour, leading to further market uncertainty 
surrounding the actual value of assets during a time 
of stress and less conﬁ  dence regarding the strength 
of banks’ balance sheets.
To help mitigate this behaviour, the third pillar of 
the Basel II framework —market discipline— sets 
out a series of required disclosures that are intended 
to complement the other two pillars of the Basel II 
framework. This should allow market participants 
to assess capital adequacy of a bank through key 
pieces of information on the scope of application, 
capital, risk exposure and the risk assessment 
process. The Committee’s January 2009 proposals 
for enhancing Pillar 3 are focused on disclosures 
related to securitisation, off-balance sheet exposures 
and trading activities. We believe that these proposed 
enhanced disclosure requirements will help to avoid 
a recurrence of market uncertainties about the 
strength of banks’ balance sheets related to their 
capital market activities. 
2|5 Cross-border 
supervisory cooperation
The ﬁ  nancial crisis has provided an abundance of 
examples highlighting the importance of supervisory 
cooperation. Indeed, a key initiative of the 
Basel Committee is to further enhance cooperation 
of supervisors globally and to facilitate an efﬁ  cient 
exchange of information. Such coordination and 
communication is the basis for promoting robust 
risk management practices and developing sound 
supervisory standards. Cross-border cooperation is 
also a prerequisite for establishing effective resolution 
techniques for systemically important banks having 
cross-border operations. The Committee is well 
along the way in evaluating the range of issues 
associated with the resolution of complex global 
banking organisations, factoring in the lessons of 
the current crisis. Before the end of this year we will 
be putting forth recommendations to strengthen the 
resolution process of cross-border banking groups. 
However these are difﬁ  cult issues that will require 
a sustained effort by regulators, legislators, central 
banks and the private sector. 
The need for effective systems of deposit insurance to 
help maintain public conﬁ  dence is another lesson of 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis. In response, the Basel Committee 
and the International Association of Deposit 
Insurers (IADI) collaborated to develop Core principles 
for effective deposit insurance systems. These core 
principles set an important benchmark for countries 
to use in establishing or reforming deposit insurance 
systems and address a range of issues including 
deposit insurance coverage, funding and prompt 
reimbursement. They also address issues related to 
public awareness, resolution of failed institutions 
and cooperation with other safety net participants 
including central banks and supervisors. 
One of the clear lessons of the crisis is that risk 
management and supervision need to maintain pace 
with ﬁ  nancial innovation. The Committee’s efforts 
to improve risk management and supervision will 
help raise the bar in these areas. In addition, the 
Basel Committee and its governing body, central 
bank governors and heads of supervision, recently 
agreed to expand the Committee’s membership 
and invite representatives from the following 
countries to join the Committee: Australia, 
Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico and Russia. 
The Basel Committee’s governance body will also be 
enlarged. The Committee believes that this expansion 
in membership will enhance the Committee’s ability 
to carry out its core mission, which is to strengthen 
regulatory practices and standards worldwide. 
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Taken together, the recent and planned initiatives of the Basel Committee will promote a more robust 
banking sector and limit the risk that weaknesses in banks amplify shocks between the ﬁ  nancial and real 
sectors. Because the measures are far reaching and ambitious, they will need to be phased in over a 
reasonable timeframe. 
The efforts of the Basel Committee need to occur in a broader context of achieving the right balance 
between the scope and depth of regulation. Failure to produce adequate regulation for other “bank like” 
activities means that tighter regulation in the banking sector will just lead to the activity migrating elsewhere. 
This highlights the importance of activities of other bodies like the G20, the Financial Stability Board and 
the Joint Forum to ensure that all sectors are subject to an appropriate degree of regulation, oversight 
or transparency commensurate with their systemic signiﬁ  cance. The Committee will continue to actively 
contribute to these other efforts.
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